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1. Consciousness is a relation -  x is conscious of y -  of which the first 
relatum, x, is an individual that is neither an event, nor a physical 
object, nor an abstract object. For neither [subjectively'} for an 
event, nor for a (purely) physical object, nor for an abstract object 
can there be anything.
2. The causality of individuals, insofar as it is intended to be active 
realization -  individual x making y actual or real - , is also such a re­
lation: a relation of which the first relatum is an individual that is 
neither an event, nor a physical object, nor an abstract object. For 
events, physical objects and abstract objects are essentially [causal­
ly} passive.
3. There are instances of consciousness, just as there are instances of 
individual realization.
4. Therefore, there is something that is a subject of consciousness, 
and something that is a subject of individual realization; in both 
cases it is an individual, but neither an event, nor a physical object, 
nor an abstract object.
5. There is a. global conflict of realization.
6. Therefore, there are many subjects of individual realization, and be­
cause of 2. these subjects are neither events, nor physical objects, 
nor abstract objects. Let them be called “acting substances” -  sub­
stantiae agentes.
7. Everything that occurs is an event, or a constituent of an event: a 
physical or mental object.
8. Whatever is a subject of realization or of consciousness is not a 
mental object. For also for mental objects there is nothing, and 
they, too, are essentially passive.
9. Consequently, acting substances do not occur (because of 6., 7. and 
8.).
10. What does not occur may yet exist; it is merely not in the world, that 
is, not in the totality of real events.
11. Acting substances exist because they are realizing something; but 
they are outside o f the world.
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12. However, acting substances are manifested in the world in their 
deeds, that is, in the events that they realize. But they are not their 
deeds, nor are they in them (they are not constituents of them); 
otherwise they would occur (contradicting 9.).
13. Many, if not all, acting substances also have manifestations that are 
not produced by them, which, in a manner, are their anchors in the 
world through which they efficiently act: their bodies, certain phy­
sical objects.
14. I am an acting substance that is manifested in its deeds and in its 
body.
15. Many complexes of events and complexes of physical objects in the 
world are significantly like my manifestations.
16. Therefore, to these occurrences there correspond many acting sub­
stances like me, namely, as substances manifested in those occur­
rences: they are manifested in bodies and deeds that, although diffe­
rent from mine, are significantly like mine.
17. I am a subject of consciousness.
18. Consequently, on the basis of 15. and in analogy to 16., there are 
many subjects of consciousness like me, the very same individuals 
that are acting substances like me. Let them be called “human sub­
stances” -substantiae humanae. And that is what we are.
19. Let subjects of consciousness in general be called “thinking sub­
stances” -  substantiae cogitantes, where it is necessary to add that 
“thinking” (cogitans) is not to be taken in the narrow sense of ab­
stract thinking, but in the wide sense of actual active and passive 
conscious experience, including, for example, feeling.
20. O n the basis of the analogy to us, it can be concluded that there are 
many non-human acting and thinking substances.
21. That there are acting substances that are not thinking is more pro­
bable than that there are thinking substances that are not acting; for 
acting seems to be more essential to substances than thinking.
22. If one refrains from calling some physical objects “substances,” as 
one should do, then there is no reason to assume that there are sub­
stances that neither think nor act.
23. Thinking substances are (because of 1. and 8.), like acting substan­
ces, neither events, nor physical objects, nor mental objects, nor ab­
stract objects. Hence they do not occur (because of 7.). Never­
theless they exist (even those of them that, perhaps, do not act), be-
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cause they have consciousness. However, they are outside o f the 
world.
24. But thinking substances are manifested in entities which are parts of 
the world: in their respective streams of consciousness, which are 
certain actual events.
25. Everything that a thinking substance is conscious of as it is in itself 
is a part or constituent of the thinking substance’s stream of con­
sciousness, and therefore in the world.
26. Consequently, since thinking substances do not occur (23.), are not 
in the world, they do not have consciousness of themselves as 
themselves, in other words, no direct consciousness of themselves. 
However, they do have consciousness of themselves in partial re­
presentation, “as in a mirror”: they are, in a certain way, included 
intentionally (included in the sense of intentionality) in their stre­
ams of consciousness, and therefore they are indirectly conscious of 
themselves. (What is included intentionally in a stream of con­
sciousness need, therefore, not be included in it as a part or consti­
tuent.)
27. The stream of consciousness of a thinking substance which is like 
me is a manifestation of it that is partially the substance’s deed, but 
partially (and for the greater part) it is not. Insofar as our streams 
of consciousness are not our deeds, they are like our bodies, which, 
as has been said in 13., are not produced by us.
28. Consequently, each human substance has three complete manife­
stations: the sum of its deeds (an event), its stream of conscious­
ness (an event), its body (a physical object, hence a constituent of 
events). The sum of its deeds and its stream of consciousness inter­
sect (have events as common parts), and some of its deeds are, like 
its body and like itself, intentional contents of its stream of con­
sciousness (that is, something the substance is indirectly conscious 
of); its body, moreover, is always a constituent of its outer deeds. 
(As the third complete manifestation of a human substance one 
could also, instead of its body, regard the sum of its bodily events 
(events being taken to include processes); in this sum the body is 
contained as a constituent.)
29. The world for a thinking substance is its stream of consciousness, 
and everything that as part or constituent or as intentional object is 
included in it. There is no reason to assume that the world for a 
thinking substance is identical with the totality of everything that is
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as part or constituent included in the -world. But doubtlessly: only 
via the -world for me do I cognize the -world, and its parts and consti­
tuents, insofar as I cognize them at all. (The cognitive contact to 
the physical world is based on the fact that many, although not all, 
of the intentional objects for a thinking substance -  that is, of the 
objects that it is indirectly conscious of -  are in fact constituents or 
parts of the physical world.)
30. Some acting substances, in particular the human substances, are 
free, that is, they sometimes, in realization, have alternatives open to 
them. However, an acting substance may also have no alternative 
(but “only one way”).
31. If an acting substance is not a thinking substance, then it is likely 
that it is not free. But if an acting substance is a thinking substance, 
then it is likely to be free. For to what purpose consciousness if the 
acting subject never has non-indifferent alternatives open to it, 
hence never has the choice of doing something to its relative (ob­
jective) advantage or its relative (objective) disadvantage? (Where 
there is consciousness, there also is rationality, however primitive; 
but where there is rationality, there is also freedom of choice, 
however limited.)
32. The unity of the world, that is, the unity of the totality of real 
events, and hence also of everything that is intrinsically connected 
to real events, is constituted by the integration of all real events in­
to one single total connection, maximal in space and time (which, 
therefore, differs from my stream of consciousness, for example), a 
connection which is in its entirety shot through with the unifying 
order of natural laws.
33. And all this in the presence of overwhelming abundance: the world 
is a cosmos.
34. That there are real events and that their totality is of the form just 
described is contingent and needs an explanation.
35. If the resplendence of the cosmos is not absurdly paired with its ul­
timate unintelligibility, then the real-existence and unity-abundance 
of the world is not a groundless fact.
36. Therefore, there is an explanation for the real-existence and unity­
abundance of the world.
37. An explanation purely on the basis of laws, of whatever kind, is, 
however, impossible. For such an explanation would carry nomolo-
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gical necessity with it (more precisely, unconditional nomological 
necessity, that is not referred to an antecedent -  or “initial” -  con­
dition). But the real-existence and unity-abundance of the world are 
not necessary, not even nomologically necessary, but completely 
contingent.
38. An explanation purely on the basis of laws is impossible also for the 
reason that an explanation of the real-existence and unity-abundan­
ce of the world must be, among other things, a causal explanation. 
But laws do not have any causal efficacy: they do not make real.
39. An explanation of the real-existence and unity-abundance of the 
world on the basis of laws and antecedent conditions that attributes 
the requisite causal efficacy to the antecedent conditions is also im­
possible. For these antecedent conditions must consist in extra- 
worldly real events, or extraworldly facts, with causal efficacy. But 
there are no extraworldly real events, and extraworldly facts have 
no causal efficacy.
40. Rather, that events are real and which events are real is the doing of 
all the acting substances.
41. Therefore, the world (more precisely, that a world really exists and 
that it is just this world, to whose character, among other things, 
this unity and this abundance belongs) is the doing of all the acting 
substances.
42. However, the plurality of the competing acting substances (cf. 5. 
and following theses) is to some extent in opposition to the unity 
of the world.
43. The best way to overcome this tension is to assume the existence of 
one single substance among the many acting and thinking substan­
ces, all others far-surpassing in power and knowledge, which gua­
rantees the unity of the world, in representation of itself and for the 
sake of the ontological value of ordered abundance, and which arbi­
trates every (otherwise irresolvable) conflict of realization.
44. It is not certain that the central substance is perfectly good, but it is 
(rationally) possible to assume its perfect goodness, in spite of the 
fact that this world is not the best of all possible worlds.
45. For the value of the character of the world is not the only measure 
for measuring the doings of the central substance. Rather, the 
perfect goodness of the central substance and the dignity of the 
other substances as potential images of the central substance — po-
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tentially to such and such an extent likenesses of it -  would require 
that the central substance concedes to every other substance the 
prima facie right to contribute to the determination of the character 
of the world, to the extent that the substance, qua being the sub­
stance it is, can do so.
46. Let it be as has just now been deliberated. But henceforth the 
perfect character of the world is left at stake and can no longer be 
guaranteed. For the prima facie right just described is in no case 
abolished, it is only limited by the interest in the real-existence and 
the unity-abundance of the world (that is, by the central substan­
ce’s own proper interest) and by the neutrality of the resolution of 
conflicts of realization.
47. The central substance prefers, in the becoming of the world, in the 
resolution of conflicts of realization, neither the good nor the bad 
substance, neither the high nor the low. For all substances other 
than the central substance are, in the measure of their abilities and 
liberties, images of the central substance, more or less similar to it, 
and each stands for a possible aspect of the central substance: each 
is a little god.
48. It is contingent that the central substance is perfectly good. For, if 
this were necessary, then it would also be necessary that the world 
exists; for the good is in its own nature that which communicates 
itself. But the real-existence of the world just is not necessary.
49. The central substance itself has chosen its own perfect goodness, 
and in consequence thereof the creation of the world (as communi­
cation of reality to it and as securing its unity-abundance, but not as a 
complete determination of reality) and the creation of all other sub­
stances (as their installation into realization and/or consciousness).
50. Because the central substance has chosen to be perfectly good, it 
has chosen the good, and insofar as the becoming of the world de­
pends on the central substance alone, it has communicated the 
good. Nevertheless, in the becoming of the world, insofar as that 
becoming does not depend on the central substance alone, but pre­
cisely because of its perfect goodness also on all the other substances, 
the central substance has not preferred the good to the bad. In this 
manner this world has come into being, and is still coming into 
being.
51. Every substance that chooses the good and communicates it does as 
the central substance does and becomes an eminent image of it.
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52. That the central substance has chosen the good is not adequately 
honored in the becoming of the world, nor is, in the becoming of 
the world, the choosing of the good by substances other than the 
central substance adequately honored, nor can this choosing be ad­
equately honored in the becoming of the world. For, because of the 
dignity of all substances that are different from the central substan­
ce, a dignity which is inviolable by the perfectly good central sub­
stance and which subsists in particular with respect to the realizing- 
relationship to the world (see 45. -  47.), the bad has de facto found 
entrance into the world to a large extent, by the substances’ contin­
gent factual choosing, but also by the necessities under which they 
stand. Moreover, in the world good is widely opposed to good ine­
vitably. (The foundering of the good because o f the good is also so­
mething bad.)
53. But the world is not all there is.
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